. Since statistical
inference methods for AR(1), including
parameter estimating,
confidence Interval constructing and hypothesis testing are well-developed and easily available, it would seem that they could successfully
applied to the problem of early detection and early situational awareness, but
it is not the case.
Note also that in mainstream approaches, early detection and situational
awareness are to some extent disconnected from each other, they are considered
absolutely separate problems. And even if we have detected outbreak, for situational
awareness we have to start from scratch since we have no
information about further development of the outbreak. In our approach, we
estimate only one parameter, the first-order autoregression coefficient in AR(1) approximation of SIR model, and we are
able not only to decide whether the outbreak has already started, but also to
get preliminary estimates of what we need for effective response and
consequence management.
To the criticism expressed in [1], [2] and
[4] regarding usefulness of such fundamental statistical
concepts as statistical significance, p-value, sensitivity, specificity, etc for early detection, we can add some skepticism of our own. It is
shown in [3] that both confidence intervals and hypothesis testing at 0.05 or
0.10 significance level are impractical for early detection purposes if we work
with a typical sample size (baseline) of 7 – 14 days. For example, a
hypothetical influenza epidemic as strong as Spanish flu cannot be detected in
7 – 14 days at 0.05 or 0.10 significance level. It is not a
surprise because statistical significance depends mostly on the sample size: in very large samples, even
very small effects will be significant, whereas in very small samples very
large effects still cannot be considered significant. See for instance data
borrowed from Table 13 in a classical book of statistical tables [5] with some linear
interpolation
Critical Values of Correlation Coefficient r
for Rejecting the Null Hypothesis (r= 0)
at the .05 Level Given Sample Size n
______________________________________________
n
r
______________________________________________
5 0.878.
7
0.755 (interpolated)
10 0.632
15
0.538 (interpolated)
20
0.444
50
0.276
.……………………………………………………….
10,000
0.0196
According
to a rule of thumb (see [6]), r = 0.5
is considered a large effect, but
still it cannot be distinguished from null hypothesis r = 0.0 with sample size n = 15 at significance level of 0.05
since critical level is 0.538. At the same time, a negligible correlation r =
0.02 is statistically significant with n
= 10,000.
Thus, the
early detection goal cannot be achieved with such a small sample size as 7 – 14
days at any acceptable significance level. Instead, we
propose to use the
concept of practical, epidemiological, significance. Actually, what really matters is
estimating the magnitude of effects, not testing whether they are zero. In our
case, the effect is assessed by the parameter R0, the basic reproductive ratio for the SIR model, and related
to R0 the first-order autoregression coefficient in AR(1)
approximation of the SIR model. In [3] it has been proposed the following early detection-combined-early
situational awareness strategy:
(1)
Every day we estimate the first-order autoregression coefficient based on the moving
baseline (from 7-day to 14-day);
(2)
With a very simple relationship between the
autoregression coefficient and R0, we actually estimate R0 (below we use the same
notation for the parameter R0
and its estimate);
(3)
Then
we compare the latter estimate with the known critical values for seasonal influenza
(1.5 ≤ R0 ≤ 3.0) and
for Spanish Flu pandemic (3.0 ≤ R0 ≤ 4.0);
(4)
Even R0 ≈ 1 is worth of some
field investigations;
If R0 ≥ 1.5 then it is epidemiologically reasonable to report our findings as
a significant risk of the epidemic;
If R0 ≥ 3.0 then it is epidemiologically reasonable to report a severe risk.
(5) Knowledge
of R0 provides us with preliminary estimates of the number of
infected at the epidemic peak and the total
number of infected over the
course of the outbreak.
Our critical levels (thresholds) have a very clear epidemiological
meaning as opposed to rather arbitrary thresholds in the mainstream
biosurveillance.
References
[1] Fricker, R. D. (2011a).
Some methodological issues in biosurveillance. Statistics in Medicine, [full
text]
[2] Fricker, R. D. (2011b).
Rejoinder: Some methodological issues in biosurveillance. Statistics in Medicine, [full text]
[3] Shtatland, E. and
Shtatland, T. (2011). Statistical approach to biosurveillance in crisis: what
is next. NESUG Proceedings, [full text]
[4] Shmueli, G. and Burkom, H. S.
(2010). Statistical challenges facing early outbreak detection in biosurveillance.
Technometrics, 52(1), pp. 39-51.
[5] Pearson, E. S. and Hartley, H. O. (Eds.).
(1962). Biometrika tables for statisticians (2nd ed.). Cambridge, MA: Cambridge
University Press.
[6] Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical power analysis for
the behavioral sciences (2nd ed.). Hillsdale,
NJ: Erlbaum.
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